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Provoked by Ananya Roy’s activist lecture tour, this essay questions the efficacy of academia’s 
social critique and the notions of agency and vocation that emerge therefrom. Moving from 
Roy’s reinterpretation of liberalism and Marxism to an appraisal of academic space as a 
faithless one shorn of its intended social and urban impact, this essay wonders out loud if 
academic production is too safe a space when it comes down to the political. Academics are 
necessarily involved in the production of sociopolitical conditions which are the subject of 
academic criticism. Rather than disavowing their connection to the nation state, academics 
should acknowledge their role in it. Taking cues from popular culture, this essay polemically 
prods scholars toward a discomfiting disengagement from the academic comfort that may 
stand in the way of difficult engagement with the world beyond academia. Aspirational as this 
is, the hope is that the practice of humbling (self-) honesty short-circuits to a hubristic heroism, 






            [E]xperience with academic reform illustrated how radical some professors 
can be when they look at the external world and how conservative when they 
look inwardly at themselves – a split personality.”
-Clark Kerr1
“There is very little danger that our images of the good society, or the good 
city, will be abused by leaders mad for power, by turning them into yet another 
tyranny, or that our words will send waves of good society warriors to their 
ignoble death, as they try to scale the impossible walls of utopia. If indeed I 
thought that was the case, I would stop writing now.”
-John Friedmann2
In his inaugural address as the University of Michigan’s 10th president, Harold Shapiro pronounced that the university 
was at once society’s servant and its critic.3 
Though this duality appears schizophrenic, 
the two modes of academe coexist in a 
convenient symbiosis comprising discrete 
but coextensive professional and scholarly 
tracks. This is not to deny that the university 
affords space for its members to alternate 
between these two hats, but they have 
grown comfortable wearing their favorite 
of the two. They are generally content with 
occupying different institutional registers, 
the cerebral gazing over the servile. But 
as Shapiro’s formulation suggests, to 
be critical is not enough to be of service. 
Academics ought to acknowledge that, 
in their capacities as intellectuals and 
mentors, they are necessarily involved in 
the production of sociopolitical conditions 
which are the subject of academic criticism. 
Turning the critical gaze to academic 
criticality means puncturing its image as a 
benignly rarefied indulgence and coming to 
terms with the fact that theory has non-
quietistic consequences. Given their relative 
privilege, I wonder what it would look like 
for critics to try on new headgear or expose 
their crowns altogether.
I am here provoked by Ananya Roy’s recent 
scholarly turn. Acutely aware of the advent 
of the “Age of Trumpism,” she has embarked 
on an international academic lecture tour 
to challenge the new(ly barefaced) status 
quo.4 Her lectures are fitting denunciations 
of the illegalities of legal power and the 
criminalization of innocent behavior. More 
subtly, they are critiques of the inhospitality 
of internalized political identity and of an 
academic life unexamined.
A scholar of global and postcolonial 
urbanism, Roy has long critiqued the 
flattening of global urban and sociocultural 
differences perpetrated by urban studies, 
asserting that the particularities of cities 
in the Global South ought to be studied 
on their own terms and not against Euro-
American urban models. To use Arif Dirlik’s 
terms, Roy’s postcolonialism is a product 
of her position as one of those “Third World 
intellectuals who have arrived in First 
World academe.”5 As a scholar of Indian 
origin producing scholarship at American 
universities, Roy finds herself in the mouth 
of a dragon she wishes to slay. It is no 
surprise that her recent scholarship turns 
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to this tension between her position 
as critic of the forms of knowledge 
produced in the Western academy and 
her privileged position as a producer 
within it.
When Roy exclaims that her goal as a 
scholar is to effect a “divestment from 
whiteness,” she essentially condemns 
the ‘classic’ liberal notions that emerge 
from said ‘whiteness.’ While it may not 
be difficult for us to accept her critique 
of ‘personhood’ and ‘property,’ more 
challenging is its implied critique of 
academic criticality, of “white Marxism.” 
The tradition of the ethnically European 
intellectual paying perfunctory 
scholarly homage to socio-economic 
justice is no longer acceptable. It is 
about time that scholars put their 
money where their pens are.
But what does this mean other than 
provincializing Europe? For one, it 
entails questioning what counts as 
academic expertise, and perhaps 
even an emergence from under the 
thick but comfortable blanket of 
scholarly dogma. Critical theory, at 
the mere level of theory, perpetuates 
the oppressiveness which it seeks 
to unmask because the unfortunate 
by-product of the theorist’s expertly 
woven web is an inescapable sense 
of hopelessness; “What happens,” as 
Frederic Jameson so forcefully put it, 
“is that the more powerful the vision 
of some increasingly total system or 
logic – the Foucault of the prisons book is 
the obvious example – the more powerless 
the reader comes to feel.”6 Ironically, the 
scholar’s power feeds off the recipient’s 
powerlessness in a paradoxical conflict of 
interest; the very opponent that the theorist 
disarms is not structural hegemony but the 
reader’s mental capacity to (re)act. Jameson 
elaborates the mechanism through which 
such a reversal takes place:
Insofar as the theorist wins, therefore, by 
constructing an increasingly closed and 
terrifying machine, to that very degree 
he loses, since the critical capacity of 
his work is thereby paralysed, and the 
impulses of negation and revolt, not to 
speak of those of social transformation, 
are increasingly perceived as vain and 
trivial in the face of the model itself.7
Jameson’s critique builds on the charitable 
premise that scholarship is, for the most 
part, earnestly serious, but accounts not for 
the possibility that it may be self-serious, 
or even sanctimonious so as to dispel the 
myths of its irrelevance, of its superfluity. 
Does knowledge production itself not 
constitute an indulgent (self-)distraction, an 
intellectual alibi from worldly engagement, 
a “culture industry” as the Frankfurt School 
would say?8
More importantly, Roy asserts that 
academia’s established forms of criticism 
are complicit in racial capitalism – that 
is, the production of spatial inequality 
under liberal democracy. The inadequacy 
of Marxist notions may be remedied, in 
her opinion, by embracing W. E. B. Du 
Bois’s work, which foregrounds urban 
racial banishment. Rendered in more 
contemporary terms, the reinterpretation 
of liberalism must take place through the 
lens of “poor group activism.”9 This line of 
reasoning is certainly not novel. At least as 
early as Cedric Robinson’s Black Marxism 
revealed that the theory’s normative reading 
of history and exclusive re-writing of the 
present was an ethnocentric call to action, 
Marxism has been marked as a racialized 
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philosophy.10 Neither is Roy’s attempt to 
reawaken the dormant new; one only has 
to read Andrew Abbott’s work on academic 
professionalization and disciplinary 
formation to recognize the cyclicality of 
knowledge production, the fractal ebb and 
flow of the same set of ideas in a world-
historical arabesque of human knowledge.11
This means that we have to resist the urge 
to continue feeding a discursive perpetual 
motion machine. Reconsidering the limits 
of the academy as we know it requires 
that we reshape the theoretical self-
understandings with which we have grown 
comfortable, as Roy has begun to do. To 
co-opt Robinson’s title, Roy’s is a ‘person 
of color’ Marxism, or a non-professorial 
Marxism. But retooling our thinking is only 
the beginning. To reinterpret the ivory tower, 
we would be well served to remember 
what this lapidary label originally meant. 
While it is widely understood today as a 
metaphor for academia’s elitist insularity, 
the term was originally coined for a different 
but not unrelated purpose: it castigated 
academia’s political intransigence – namely, 
its hesitance to readily embrace anti-
Communist patriotism.12 While academia 
may indeed be applauded for attempting 
to resist the hysteria of the Red Scare, to 
merely applaud the academic establishment 
is to accept complacency, if not the socio-
political complicity of which Roy speaks. 
Bluntly put, there is no such thing as a 
principled (read: academic) withdrawal from 
society. Even mythical Wakanda came to 
accept that an enlightened hermit kingdom 
was no beacon of light for the world.13, 14, 15 
The academy is no virtuous city; endless 
brooding and academic agonism over 
profound truths are trivial relative to the 
trials and tribulations of life.
To use a Game of Thrones analogy, scholars 
are the Starks, Lannisters, and Tyrells 
of an intellectual Westeros, fighting with 
words over a lectern throne while the 
world around them falls apart.16 What our 
Intellecteros is missing is a Daenerys, an 
insurgent playing the same game but very 
differently: unshackling slaves, winning 
fealty, building an army by saving both lives 
and livelihoods.17 The scholarly class may 
perhaps identify with the Starks, but it would 
behoove it to acknowledge its own stark 
feudality.
The academic relationship to the profane is 
no less than a vicarious one. No matter how 
Vulcan academics may strive to be, on their 
shoulders falls the burden of the Jedi amidst 
a fractious world.18 Fallibly privileged, theirs 
is the last station in the two-decade-long 
minting of national standard bearers.19, 20, 21 
Roy recognizes that the pursuit of truth is 
not above worldly affairs. Her contentions 
are premised on the unforsakeability of 
politics. The political can no longer be 
untangled from the existential. If the rise 
of the nation-state was indeed a liberalist 
alternative to god and king, as Benedict 
Anderson argues, the baby of pastoralism 
must have been thrown out with the water 
of paternalism.22 In the new world order, 
patriotism replaced ecumenicism and the 
nation-state became the new denomination, 
a novel geopolitical tribe making total war 
possible.
     The inverse of Monarchy and Faith being 
collective atheism, abstract politics became 
the sole modern realm of collectivity, 
granting the restless human the subject-
position of citizen whose worthy and valiant 
self-sacrifice was redirected towards a 
secular, but just as inaccessible, cause. 
Inherent to the nation-state model then 
is the sacrifice of lives and trampling 
of bodies. Within this paradigm, human 
compassion is only legitimate when coupled 
with nationalism, for the glory of the nation 
is modernity’s larger-than-life purpose of 
life.23, 24, 25, 26 
This aggregate form of vanity similarly 
afflicts Marxism, whose reification of class 
underwrites the discharging of humans 
from the barrels of a tautological cause. 
One of theory’s roles is to articulate a 
“salve for the anxiety of approaching self-
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dissolution.”27 These articulations take 
different forms, like the nation and the 
party, which become worth dying for. 
Roy is rightly critical of the scholars 
who pull that trigger but would never 
put themselves in the barrel. They 
are a ‘class consciousness’ – a party 
– just intelligent enough not to paint 
themselves as such, for to claim the 
paternalistic designation of organized 
governing collective is to dissolve the 
veneer of benign wisdom.
This makes sense in light of Roy’s 
assertion that “the most important 
terrain of politics is the university.”28 If 
the humanities tell us what it means to 
be human, then they necessarily also 
demarcate that which is subhuman. 
How bloody were the American and 
French Revolutions that scholars 
so admire, and how bloody were the 
Haitian and Russian Revolutions they 
care not to admire! How worthless 
were the past lives and bodies of the 
royalists, how worthless are the lives of 
today’s extra-nationals! Theorists shield 
themselves from such externalities, 
ignoring the inconvenient truth that justice is 
rarely bloodless.
The truth is that theory can be deadly, and 
the rule of law can be deadly. Just as they 
serve to assert the value of human life, 
they allow us to assign value to the denial 
of life.29, 30 Academic calls to arms are not 
always metaphorical.31, 32, 33 Even when they 
are, theoretical enactments are liable to 
take on necropolitical lives of their own.34 
Though we are not remotely likely to stop 
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producing theories, technologies, and 
images of a different tomorrow, we should 
at the very least wrestle with the real 
possibility that “our words will send waves 
of good society warriors to their ignoble 
death, as they try to scale the impossible 
walls of utopia” – and with the unfortunate 
reality that the route to the latter often 
runs through the former.35 Exceedingly 
challenging as it is to articulate what is 
worthy of the (citizen’s and scholar’s) 
ultimate sacrifice, an opportunity looms 
to redefine that which is worthy of being 
sacrificed.
As much as we hate to admit, saviors come 
“not to bring peace, but a sword.”36 In a way, 
Roy claims one sword along with which 
comes a concurrent right to its acumination. 
She does not simply accept her academic 
‘license to kill’ but commandeers it in order 
to recast the dragon on the shoulders of 
which she soars as a sacrificial lamb.37 Less 
putting words in her mouth than putting a 
dagger in her hand, her scholarship is one 
that acknowledges its self-righteousness 
and turns scholarship against itself. To use 
an Inception metaphor, the only way out of 
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